Hamilton’s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
Jonathan A. Rodden
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book provides a new perspective on why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
Anno:
2005
Casa editrice:
Cambridge University Press
Lingua:
english
Pagine:
334
ISBN 10:
0511137168
ISBN 13:
9780521842693
Collana:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
File:
PDF, 2.23 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2005
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